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Why Standards? Part 2
Three Years of Indecision for Color ... That Didn't Work
Original Text by Kyle Moore; foreword by Doug Larson

• The greatest show on earth
• Devils advocate
• In the field
• Neither ready for prime time
• Boiling point
• Backpedaling
• Will the Commission delay?
• Bottom Line

The completion of the first round of Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) certification was a watershed moment in the evolution the cable TV industry. This process has served to establish a new touchstone for cooperation among operators and vendors and underscores the commitment of this industry to grow and meet the challenges of a rapidly advancing telecommunications environment. However, despite the successes, some remain skeptical.

In the hope of swaying some naysayers, we revisit the color TV standard fiasco of a half-century ago. Originally published in "CATJ" by Kyle Moore (then president of CATA) and edited for publication in "CT," this article provides a blow-by-blow account of how politicians and TV set manufacturers almost set television back on its heels.

In the first installment, Moore took us ringside as the two color system proponents, CBS and RCA, first faced off against one another in Federal Communications

Commission hearings that began in the fall of 1949. At the time, the RCA Sarnoff system was described as experimental, while the CBS system had been around for nearly 10 years. Both suffered problems.

Following a private demonstration of its color system at the Armory in Washington, D.C., during the regular hearings, the FCC challenged CBS to "show off its color." Over the next few months, the battle heated up as both companies worked around the clock to get their systems accepted as the national standard.

All the while, the Commission was under the relentless attacks of Colorado Sen. Edward Johnson, who badgered the Commission to approve a color standard without further delay.

The greatest show on earth

In the fall of 1949, at the urging of the Commission, RCA set up their owned-and-operated WNBW in Washington, D.C., to start limited schedule colorcasting. Six custom receivers were placed in "typical locations" and used under "typical home conditions."

During the fall 1949 hearings, others appeared on the scene for the color TV standards prize. One hung in there until the end: Color Television Inc. of San Francisco. The CTI system also was all-electronic, but its major contribution to the color squabble would be nearly a year later.

Late in 1949, the FCC announced the game plan and rules for color demonstrations before that body: "The demonstrations will include color TV camera equipment, color TV receivers, monochrome receivers, and converted monochrome receivers (that is, converted to receive CBS color in black and white). The receivers to be demonstrated will include four receivers receiving color only in a 6 MHz wide band, one receiver for demonstration of 6 MHz color vs. wider (12 MHz) color; one conventional black-and-white receiver converted for color reception and one black-and-white receiver not converted.

"The demonstration will include slides, test patterns, dancing, singing, juggling, fashions, near and far shots, different types of lighting and backgrounds. In one demonstration, the camera equipment will be located at a local (Washington) high school football field."

CBS, the company first slated for demonstration, really put on a show. One Commissioner said: "This was the darnedest three-ring circus you ever saw. TV studio equipment was all over the hearing room. We had to thread our way to our seats through cables, lights and jugglers rehearsing."

The RCA demonstration had a little less P.T. Barnum. Set up in the studios of Washington, D.C.s WNBW in the Wardman Park Hotel, they consisted of two color cameras for live (TV studio) presentations, a color film camera and a color slide camera. Two color TV monitors in the studio, plus a special 16-inch receiver, were set up for the observers.

RCA put on an elaborate, tasteful program consisting of solo performances by network stars of that era and a musical program staged with 19 musicians, all brightly attired in colorful costumes.

After the two shows, the general attitude was that the RCA demonstration produced impressionable black-and-white (compatible) pictures, but that color pictures were flawed. RCA had not developed a single-gun picture tube for the receiver at that time, and to produce a 16-inch picture, RCA had to custom build a large cabinet that housed three separate black-and-white picture tubes, arranged with dichroic type mirrors to focus the three separate red, blue and yellow images on a single 16-inch screen.

The RCA tests lasted a full week, and as the week wore on, the picture quality improved considerably. Unfortunately, FCC personnel were among the first to see the show. Sen. Johnson came late, toward the end of the week, and after he saw the RCA demonstration he said: "I am impressed by the demonstration, and I was surprised because of what I had been told to expect. I think the RCA method has some vital features."

Devils advocate

While the demonstration attracted only RCA and CBS at that point, testimony and evidence being taken simultaneously by the Commission were not limited to the two contenders. Many firms had a vital interest in the hearings. One of these was DuMont.

DuMonts contribution to the early TV era (pre-war until the early 1950s) cannot be overestimated. DuMont originally owned and operated TV stations in New York (WABD), Washington, D.C., (WTTG) and Pittsburgh (WDTV). These stations were among the first on the air in the nation, and DuMont also operated a TV "network" in that era, competing with NBC (RCA) and CBS for station affiliations and audience.

DuMont had no direct interest in color development, and Dr. Allen B. DuMont, as we shall see, seriously questioned the importance of color at that point. For its role in the color hearings, history must award to DuMont the title of Devils Advocate. DuMont personnel submitted briefs and testimony, and for one fleeting, highly entertaining moment, put on a memorable demonstration for the FCC. The occasion was late in the fall in 1949. DuMont personnel, headed by Dr. Goldsmith, sat through the CBS demonstrations and apparently got madder by the day.

As scientists and electronic engineers, they saw through the technical mumbo-jumbo that CBS was dishing out to the nontechnical Commissioners. One thing really stuck in the craw of DuMont, and that was the CBS glib dismissal of big-screen color TV utilizing the spinning wheel that was a part of the CBS system. Because the wheel was more than twice the diameter of the picture tube screen, large screen receivers became physically very large very soon. A 20-inch screen, for example, would require a disc more than 48 inches in diameter, protruding not only far to the side of the screen itself, but also far above the screen. DuMont had hoped that this point, and the fact that CBS demonstrated no receivers with larger than 12.5-inch screens, would become apparent to the Commission.

When it did not, DuMonts Goldsmith asked for and received time on the program for a demonstration. At the appointed time, DuMont personnel rolled in a huge cart. On the cart was a 700-pound apparatus consisting of a color spinning wheel, motor to turn the wheel and the associated receiver. The machine, carefully constructed to be representative of the true situation and as modern as the CBS color wheel art would permit, measured 6.5 feet long, 4.5 feet thick, and 4.5 feet high. The end result was 700 pounds of motor, whirling wheel and a then-giant 20-inch picture tube. When the huge 4-foot-plus wheel began to spin at 210 miles per hour, the load on the electrical circuit in the FCC hearing room became too great, and the fuse blew, throwing the system into darkness.

FCC Chairman Wayne Coy became irate at this point and shouted at Goldsmith to "stop this side show." FCC Commissioner Frieda Hennock also blasted Goldsmith and called the demonstration "a ridicule of CBS and completely unfair to CBS." Coy called a recess, and the room cleared. Two Commissioners, Jones and Sterling, stuck around as Goldsmith re-ignited his machine. Over the roar of his huge whirling disc, Goldsmith told the two remaining Commissioners, "We just got sick and tired of all the claims about easy conversion of present receivers to CBS-type color and decided to show folks how ridiculous such conversions really are."

There also were cooler, calmer heads present. One, David B. Smith, vice president of research and development for Philco, told the Commissioners the view of his company regarding the establishment of color TV standards: "The standards must be such as to permit the public, individually, and at their personal option, to be able to have either black-and-white or color reception with no loss of programming service either way. Both color and black-and-white must be transmitted on a single set of standards so that each type of signal can be received interchangeably on either black-and-white or color receivers. The standards must provide a quality of service at least as good as that now provided by the present commercial standards. The continuity of existing service to receivers in the hands of the public must be maintained. Any proposal of incompatible standards must include a detailed program to accomplish this purpose. In arriving at these standards, there shall be no experimenting at the expense of the public. The Commission must assure the public that the system has been thoroughly proven before authorization of commercial service."

Seemingly, this type of statement should or would have come not from a member of the industry, but from the Commission itself. Alas, it did not, and aside from its historical perspective on the right and wrong ways to do things, it apparently had very little impact on the Commission at the time. It was probably too sane, and made too much sense to be seriously considered.

In the field

Because the RCA and CBS systems were viewed by the Commission under different circumstances, the Commission then decided to spend more of the two applicants and the publics money. They would ask for so-called field trials, side by side comparisons. Thus, the stage was set for the next round of the sideshow.

Throughout the tests the quality of the color was the ladder rung on which the Commission stood. Public interest seemed to be the interest of getting good quality color, and no one seriously considered the incompatibility aspect of the problem.

Most of the official remarks sound pretty much like this quote: "The images were far brighter and truer in color fidelity than in earlier tests. Operation was stable and completely free of flicker."

During the course of the field trials, others became embroiled in the controversy. The Radio Manufacturers Association put out a booklet that was titled, "Is Color Television Ready For The Home?" This was a blunt, no-holds barred booklet that stated: "& the majority of television set manufacturers urge that no color broadcasting standards be approved by the FCC until all proposed systems have been thoroughly field tested. When standards are set, all future improvements must be within the framework of the basic original standards. The original standards must be sound and suitable for decades to come. The proposed CBS system uses only 405 lines for picture definition; this is a 45 percent reduction in picture detail and clarity."

As the tests wore on, DuMont chastised Sen. Johnson and FCC Commissioner Robert F. Jones. The Doctor said: "Commissioner Jones condemns private interests who question the Commissions handling of color TV standards to date, simply because these private interests think it would be a grave mistake to foist unsatisfactory color on the American public. The Commissioner condemns more than 100 manufacturers of TV receivers, TV broadcasters and TV transmitter manufacturers because we think it is a criminal mistake to make the future allocation of additional channels for black-and-white wait for a decision on the matter of color. A truly intelligent and lasting decision on the matter of color may take years, and spokesmen for our industry do not think the public will be willing, or should be forced, to wait these years to enjoy adequate TV reception."

Neither ready for prime time

Of the two primary contenders for the color prize, DuMont said: "Neither system is adequate. In one the color changes every minute (RCA), and in the other the color fidelity is poor (CBS)."

By mid-spring of 1950, the hearings had ground down to who could claim they would do the most for the public. NBCs John H. McDonnell told the Commission his network would immediately start regular colorcasting from New York. McDonnell stated his network would extend color service to places like Providence, R.I.; Philadelphia; Toledo, Ohio; and Davenport, Ind., by the end of the summer (1950). CBSs Stanton promised 20 hours of color programming per month within 90 days of authorization of its system.

McDonnell countered Stantons hours claim by stating: "Broadcasters would be unable to transmit color during the choice evening hours with the CBS system because they would lose virtually all of the black-and-white-only audience, something that is not economically feasible when programming must be paid for by advertising dollars."

In May, RCAs General Sarnoff created a bit of a stir when he stated that if the RCA system was approved, RCA would share all of the data with every manufacturer and that anyone would be free to manufacture and sell compatible system color receivers. This took CBS back a step or two because they had been quite blatant about their plans to be the primary source of their own receivers and to allow secondary royalty paying receiver sources to develop only after CBS tooled up.

Boiling point

Finally, it all came to a head: more than 10,000 pages of testimony and 250 exhibits of material, diagrams, data and engineering studies. Very late in the race, Donald K. Lippincott, representing the California firm CTI, shook the FCC with several statements. He said:

1) The RCA system and the CBS system were too complicated for the average service technician to handle or the average viewer to adjust.

2) The CBS system would be financially difficult if not disastrous to all but a handful of the largest TV manufacturers.

3) And why has no one looked into the matter of interference in color reception?

This last point created a first-class rhubarb. RCA and CBS in particular moved that CTI field experience (it had been testing its system over KPIX in San Francisco and perhaps had more actual on-the-air time, through a nontest facility, than CBS and RCA combined) not be allowed into the record. RCA and CBS contended that no one else had conducted field trials in medium signal and fringe areas, as CTI claimed to have done, and the CTI results of these tests should not be considered as evidence when they alone had conducted the tests. CTIs interference evidence was quite harmful because it showed that color transmissions were much more susceptible to interference (man-made and weak signals) than black-and-white transmissions.

This plainly upset FCC Chairman Wayne Coy, who recalled quickly that all of his problems with an allocations freeze had come from the emergence of interference as a limiting factor in station coverage zones. He saw the potential of a whole new set of interference problems (now color-related) leading to another allocations fiasco.

That nobody had sought to prove colors transmission characteristics outside of the secure in-town reception areas is incomprehensible today. It accentuates, however, the Commissions concern only with "color fidelity" and its almost complete ignorance of the real questions involved in approving a color transmission and reception standard.

Backpedaling

After the clamor died down in the hearing room, Coy remarked: "I would like to comment that this exhibit brings into sharp focus the difficult problems that the Commission faces. It is apparent that a successful TV system cannot be maintained unless a sound allocation (of channels) program is established.

"A sound allocation program is not possible unless the Commission has adequate interference data. It has been the consistent experience of the Commission in this and other proceedings that it is virtually impossible to get the parties to submit adequate interference data.

"So far as the parties are concerned, no adequate interference data was offered by any of the parties at the outset. Moreover, when, after extensive prodding by the Commission, the parties did produce some interference data, it is apparent (from the extensive CTI exhibit) that not nearly as much effort and ingenuity went into the preparation and presentation of such evidence as compared with other aspects of the parties cases.

"I hope that this proceeding will teach all of us the importance, not only to the Commission, but to the industry and the public, of securing and offering adequate data on interference, so that sound decisions can be made on an allocation basis, under which the (TV) industry can build with reliance on the fact that unforeseen interference conditions will not severely limit the service areas which have been anticipated, and thus deprive many rural viewers of the service. People who live in rural areas are important people."

Will the Commission delay?

Seemingly, the Commission now had plenty of reasons to delay the decision on color for quite a while. To restate them:

• The leading contender system, CBS, was not compatible; people could not watch CBS color programs in black-and-white without special converters.
• In spite of CBS statements to the contrary, the CBS color system was limited to relatively small picture tube sizes, and, as DuMont demonstrated, even 20-inch pictures with the giant wheel were impractical.
• The two electronic systems, CTI and RCA, had made dramatic progress in the period 1949-1950. Even the Commission was aware that every week brought improvements.
• The CTI and RCA systems were compatible; that is, people could see colorcast programs in black-and-white on the nearly 9,000,000 existing receivers.
• Based upon CTI evidence, the question of color picture quality in areas outside principal cities (where interference and weak signals could be a problem) was largely unresolved. CTI said that pictures in rural areas went downhill faster in color than in black-and-white and that satisfactory service areas for color were much smaller than with black-and-white.

Seemingly, with the exception of Sen. Johnson, most everyone could agree that a further delay was in the best interests of the public.

Stay tuned for the third and final installment when the U.S. Supreme Court and Korean War join the cast of characters and a color standard victor is crowned. CT

Doug Larson is senior editor at "Communications Technology." He may be reached via e-mail at .

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