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Why Standards? Part 3
Three Years of Indecision for Color & That Didnt Work
Original text by Kyle Moore; forward by Doug Larson

• Stay of Execution
• Lawsuits
• Supreme Court ruling
• Conflict and resolution
• The point
• Bottom Line

If cable is to grow and meet the challenges of a rapidly advancing telecommunications environment, standards will become increasingly important. However, some remain skeptical of the need for standards.

In hopes of swaying some naysayers, we revisit the color TV standard fiasco of a half-decade ago. Originally published in "CATJ" by Kyle Moore (then president of CATA), the article provides a blow-by-blow account of the squabble, which nearly scuttled television entirely.

In the first installment, the two color system proponents, CBS and RCA, first faced off against one another in Federal Communications Commission hearings that began in the fall of 1949. The RCA Sarnoff system was experimental, while the CBS system had been around for nearly 10 years. Both had problems.

Over the next few months, the battle heated up as both companies worked around the clock to get their systems accepted as the national standard.

In our last installment, the color standard race picked up speed as RCA and CBS continued their demonstrations, and Color Television Inc. of San Francisco joined the party. Throughout the tests, quality of color was paramount to the FCC. Public interest seemed to be the interest of getting good color, and no one seriously considered the incompatibility aspect of the problem.

The CBS system was the leading contender, but people could not watch CBS color programs in black-and-white without costly converters. Meanwhile, CTI and RCA made dramatic progress in their systems, and both were compatible; that is, people could watch colorcast programs in black-and-white on the nearly 9 million existing receivers.

These developments, as well as the largely unexplored issue of color signal interference, led many to believe that the FCC would delay its color standard decision. All the while, the Commission was under relentless attack from Colorado Sen. Edward Johnson, who badgered the Commission to approve a color standard immediately.

This third and final installment details the resolution of the conflict by, of all things, another conflict.

So it was some surprise when in September 1950 that the Commission released a 48-page "memo decision" awarding the color prize to CBS.

The Commission, by a 4-2-1 vote, approved the CBS system, but left a carrot dangling for CTI and RCA. It told the two firms, "You have until December 5th to demonstrate how improvements in your existing color will bring it up to the grade of the CBS quality."

The memo made little mention of the compatibility problem. It stated: "If a compatible system that produced satisfactory pictures was available, it would certainly be desirable to adopt such a system. Compatibility would facilitate, for the broadcaster, the transition from black-and-white to color broadcasting and would reduce to a minimum the obsolescence problem of present receivers. However, no satisfactory compatible system was demonstrated at these proceedings."

Sen. Johnson made public a letter to FCC Chairman Wayne Coy in which he said: "The decision brings very close the day when this great new improvement will serve the American people. I know every effort will be made to push forward rapidly the allocation decisions so that television will be made available to many more millions of citizens who are waiting impatiently to have television in their homes."

Dissenting on the rushed choice of CBS, Commissioner Frieda Hennock said: "Incompatibility will produce a serious problem for the broadcaster, and its effects will very likely be felt by all TV viewers. To the extent that there are receivers in the hands of the public which are unable to receive field-sequential color broadcasts, every program broadcast under those standards will entail a loss of audience for the broadcaster. The decision to produce a program in color will be a difficult one for the broadcaster if it means that the program will become less salable."

Stay of execution

While the shock of the decision was wearing off and RCA and CTI were working 24 hours a day to meet the Dec. 5 reprieve deadline, someone noticed some fine print in the 48-page decision.

It said that within 60 days of finalization of the new color standard, all receivers produced for interstate commerce would be required to have a built-in capability to switch between standard 525-line black-and-white and 405-line field sequential color (in black-and-white). This meant that all TV sets would have to be capable of receiving standard black-and-white broadcasts in black-and-white, and at the throw of a switch, CBS colorcasts in black-and-white. This was a "conversion" that CBS had earlier stated the average set owner (by now there were 9 million sets in use) could make at $75 per set.

The receiver manufacturers came unglued. "We cant change over that fast," most cried. Others questioned the authority of the Commission to force an extra-cost receiver standard into receivers. CBS considered the ruling a victory.

When the receiver manufacturers brought their case to the FCC, a new bit of intrigue developed. FCC Commissioner Harry Plotkin let the cat out of the bag when he announced that FCC Engineer Ed Chapin had constructed in the FCC laboratory a receiver that "featured automatic adaptation from 525-line black-and-white to 405-line color, shown black-and-white, thereby eliminating the need for a manual switch. If the receiver manufacturers were upset when they went into the session, they became irate when Plotkin dropped that bomb.

The RCA attorney said: "This development of Mr. Chapins constitutes what might be considered an improvement in the CBS system. The Commission has set itself up in a judicial capacity to hear evidence between two or three competing systems. Now the Commissions own staff comes forward with an invention, which seems to be an improvement of the system proposed by one of the litigants. It seems to us as if we have a situation where the judicial group is assisting one of the parties in the contest. We think this is inconsistent with the judicial position which the Commission should take in these proceedings."

Chairman Coy showed a flash of temper as he rebuked the RCA attorney, defending the role that the Commission had played to date. He then explained that the Chapin circuit was going to be the subject of a patent application, said patent to be owned by the U.S. government. The exchange left an extremely bitter rift between the Commission and the receiver industry, not to mention RCA.

Lawsuits

Within weeks, two lawsuits were filed, both landing in the U.S. District Court in Chicago. One suit was filed by a TV receiver manufacturer (Emerson) and another by RCA. Both suits charged "& that industry, broadcasters and set owners stand to be seriously affected by this ruling of the FCC &. The order is contrary to public interest, is arbitrary and capricious, and exceeds the authority of the Commission &. The order is not supported by the evidence."

Both suits sought injunctive relief from the courts to keep the FCC from enforcing the order and putting the color standards and new compatible receiver standards into effect. One suit stated: "Although the Commission has no jurisdiction over receiver manufacturers, the Commission seeks to require that such manufacturers agree with the Commission to build all of their black-and-white receivers according to specifications laid down by the Commission. These specifications require extensive alterations in present production model receivers."

Obviously, todays color receivers do not have the large spinning color discs required by the CBS system, so somehow we must have gotten out of this predicament. One could reasonably think that the courts turned the matter around. They did not.

Supreme Court ruling

The case moved through the courts with lightning speed, and the U.S. Supreme Court had it in no time at all. Because the FCC was the defendant, U.S. Solicitor General Philip B. Pearlman presented the case for the FCC. The Supreme Court provided a good forum, although it initially was uncertain just how far the court should go; should it, for example, re-study all the technical evidence that went into the FCC decision and perhaps hold another round of hearings? Justice Jackson was particularly interested in this question because everyone was plowing new ground.

Justice Frankfurter asked the CBS counsel whether "& the FCC decision does not create a condition in which a possible monopoly might develop if the incompatible system were developed." He also asked how a government commission, not composed of experts, could foreclose, once and for all, the further development of color systems and improvements by accepting the CBS system at this point, then closing the door to others thereafter.

After a couple of months, the Supreme Court released a decision: It backed the FCCs right to establish a standard for color TV, and in effect, the CBS system was finally approved.

But in the process of passing judgment on the FCCs legal right to set and adopt standards for color TV, it was evident that the Supreme Court dug deeply enough into the evidence and exhibits to make another determination. In its decision, the Supreme Court said: "However, the wisdom of the decision (by the FCC) can be contested, as evidenced by the fact that two of the Commissioners dissented in the decision. It is not the job or function of the courts, however, to overrule an administrative decision merely because the courts may disagree with its wisdom."

It appeared that the Supreme Court was establishing a dangerous precedent for future contestants of the FCC. In effect, as long as the FCC was within its legal framework to make a decision, it could make virtually any decision it wished. And these decisions would not be overturned by any federal court, even the Supreme Court, based on the questionable wisdom of the FCC decision.

Perhaps the broadcasting industry did not realize it at the time, but this was to become a significant milestone for future TV hassles. The doctrine of administrative agency expertise was to become supreme, larger even than the Supreme Court. All the FCC had to do to stay out of trouble was to base decisions on whatever criteria it wished, as long as it stayed within the broad regulatory areas that the Communications Act of 1934 established.

Conflict and resolution

As previously stated, we do not have CBS field sequential color spinning discs in our receivers todaywe have all electronic colorcasting. If the Supreme Court backed the FCC, what prevented CBS from running with the ball? Believe it or not, it was the Korean War.

During the late summer and fall of 1951, CBS felt pretty comfortable, though RCA and others steadily made large-scale improvements in their color systems. CBS announced ordering 250,000 small electric motors for color receivers, as well as a small increase in color broadcasting activity.

Then, in mid-fall of 1951, the Washington Chief of Defense Operations Charles E. Wilson did what the federal courts could not do for RCA and the all-electronic color group. It shut down CBS production of color sets. The defense industry requirements of the Korean War had built steadily, and certain materials used in CBS color receivers were required for the war effort. Because CBS was the only manufacturer of CBS color receivers at that point, CBS also shut down its colorcasting for the duration of the war. Without receivers, why have programs?

At the point of shutdown, CBS color receivers were just beginning to come off the production line. At the same time, the compatible color group made dramatic improvements in its system. Some were certain that CBS engineered the shutdown to keep itself from being financially and nationally embarrassed by a fatally flawed color system. Others opined that RCA and others prompted the Department of Defense visit to CBS to keep CBS from getting a head start with 12-inch whirling disc color receivers. Still others merely accepted the fact that the CBS production needed to be shut down for the war effort.

And when the Korean War was over and the manufacturing embargoes were lifted, the interim development of compatible color had run full circle. In a not very controversial and not very lengthy debate, all the industry supported the compatible color program initiated by RCA, which became the standard. In 1954, the nation would purchase 5,000 compatible color TV receivers, followed by 25,000 the next year.

The point

Had the Korean War not come along, we might very well have been saddled with a thoroughly unworkable color standard, which easily could have hampered the industry for years thereafter. The standards process of the daycontrolled by nontechnical FCC commissioners, rather than engineerssimply wasnt up to the task.

Todays standards processesrun by industry engineers, as they should beare vastly improved over this 50-year-old example. Competitive pressures, squabbling and delays do still crop up from time to time, but theyre a far cry from the crippling foolishness illustrated in this story. In fact, they run extremely well, if not quite instantaneously.

The next time someone questions the necessity of "all this work just for some dang standard," it might pay to bring up the color TV standard fiasco of the late 40s and early 50s. CT

Doug Larson is senior editor at "Communications Technology."

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